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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHRISTINE B. BURGON, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
BURNELL H. BURGON, 
Defendant-Appellant, ] 
\ Case No. 960137-CA 
) Category No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE CHRISTINE B. BURGON 
I. JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This appeal arises out of a divorce decree entered by the Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Utah. Accordingly, this Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
H. ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the award of alimony to the appellee constitute a clear and prejudicial 
abuse of the trial court's considerable discretion? 
Standard of Review: An alimony award will be upheld unless the appellant can 
demonstrate clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 
516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); 
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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2. Was the trial court's division of the equity in the parties' marital residence 
inequitable? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's division of the parties' marital assets is entitled 
to a presumption of validity. Breinholt, 905 P.2d at 881. 
3. Although not an issue for appellate review, the trial court ruled that 
defendant/appellant would be responsible to pay the attorney's fees incurred by 
plaintiff/appellee for future proceedings. Thus, appellee seeks an award of attorney's fees 
incurred to defend this appeal. 
III. STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
TO THE APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) 
(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with 
Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and 
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of 
living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no 
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children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may 
consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize 
the parties' respective standards of living. 
(1995) 
IV, STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition. 
In November 1993, plaintiff Christine B. Burgon (hereafter, "Ms. Burgon") 
commenced this divorce action against Burnell H. Burgon (hereafter, "Mr. Burgon"). On 
July 26, 1995, the trial court conducted a one-day trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the 
trial court rendered an oral ruling from the bench, issuing numerous oral findings and 
conclusions. Among the rulings made by the trial court was that Mr. Burgon would be 
responsible to bear the attorney's fees that Ms. Burgon would incur in future proceedings 
related to the ruling. On January 29, 1996, the trial court entered a divorce decree, as well 
as written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thereafter, Ms. Burgon's trial counsel 
withdrew from the case and Fabian & Clendenin entered an appearance on behalf of 
Ms. Burgon. 
Mr. Burgon now appeals two aspects of the trial court's ruling. First, Mr. Burgon 
contends that the alimony awarded to Ms. Burgon is excessive. He also contends that the 
manner in which the trial court divided the equity in the parties' marital home was 
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inequitable. In this appeal, Ms. Burgon requests that the Court affirm the trial court's ruling 
in all aspects and order Mr. Burgon to pay the reasonable attorney's fees that Ms. Burgon 
incurs to defend Mr. Burgon's appeal. 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review. 
Facts Related to the Award of Alimony 
When Ms. Burgon graduated from high school, she began attending Brigham Young 
University on a full scholarship. (R. 202 and 203.) Ms. Burgon married Mr. Burgon in 
July 1974. (R. 168.) Ms. Burgon was twenty years of age (See R. at 202.) Before 
Ms. Burgon was able to complete her Bachelors Degree, the couple had their first child. 
(R. 203.) Thereafter, the Burgons jointly decided that it was in the best interest of their 
family for Ms. Burgon to be at home full-time with their children and Ms. Burgon was never 
able to complete her four-year degree. (Id.) 
Ms. Burgon fulfilled the role she had accepted as part of the couple's joint decision, 
and, from the birth of their first child, was the primary caretaker for the children. (R. 168 
and 317.) Ms. Burgon watched over the household responsibilities. (R. 238 and 239.) The 
Burgons had three children, who at the time of trial were nineteen, seventeen and thirteen 
years of age. (R. 203 and 204.) Their thirteen-year-old daughter is a special needs child 
who suffers from a rare form of muscular dystrophy known as "Central Cord Disease." 
(R. 204.) Because of these special needs, Ms. Burgon has been required to give more time 
and attention to their daughter than is normally required of a thirteen-year-old child. 
(R. 207.) 
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Because Ms. Burgon fulfilled the responsibilities related to raising the couple's 
children, Mr. Burgon was free to work outside of the home, focusing all of his energies on 
developing his career. (R. 317.) Mr. Burgon become a "workaholic," achieving positions of 
responsibility at his work place. (R. 299 and 318.) Mr. Burgon was not generally at home 
even in the evenings. (R. 238.) 
For approximately fifteen years prior to the couple's separation, Ms. Burgon worked 
part-time at St. Marks hospital, averaging anywhere from six to twenty hours per week. 
(R. 215 and 248.) Shortly before the couple's divorce trial, the financial circumstances that 
resulted from the parties' separation required Ms. Burgon to increase her hours and she is 
now working thirty-six hours per week. (R. 215 and 247.) Ms. Burgon earns $9.84 per 
hour. (R. 216). As found by the Court, Ms. Burgon's monthly income is approximately 
$1550 per month. (R. 170, 215, 247 and 386.) Ms. Burgon presently is assigned to the 
hospital's Women's Health Services department. (Id.) Her responsibilities include patient 
registration, obtaining medical background from patients, setting appointments for patients, 
obtaining patients' insurance information and related matters. (Id.) The skills required for 
Ms. Burgon's job include basic computer skills and typing skills. (Id.) 
As of the date of the divorce, Ms. Burgon was forty-one years of age. (R. 202.) 
The Burgons had been married twenty-one years. (R. 231.) The separation and divorce 
have caused a significant economic hardship upon Ms. Burgon. Her income level has 
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decreased to the point that she now does some of her shopping at the Deseret Industries. 
(R. 287.) Ms. Burgon has received financial assistance from her church to meet her 
financial obligations. (R. 243). 
In contrast to Ms. Burgon's ability to produce income, Mr. Burgon obtained a 
Bachelor's of Science degree in business administration. He presently holds the title of 
Director of Personnel at the Utah Air National Guard. (R. 302.) As found by the trial 
court, Mr. Burgon earns approximately $4640 per month. (R. 170, 310, 331, 386 and 387.) 
Mr. Burgon expects to receive future annual raises of roughly $1200 per year. (R. 346.) 
The trial court found Mr. Burgon's income to be "substantially higher than Ms. Burgon's 
income. (R. 393.) Indeed, Mr. Burgon's income is approximately three times higher than 
Ms. Burgon's income. 
A few months before the Burgons separated, Mr. Burgon's behavior changed 
dramatically. (R. 12.) He began arriving home as late as Three o'clock in the morning. 
{Id.) Ms. Burgon would question Mr. Burgon about his behavior and Mr. Burgon would 
respond that Ms. Burgon was merely paranoid. {Id.) Ms. Burgon asked Mr. Burgon to 
attend marriage counseling with her. (R. 13.) Mr. Burgon did not take Ms. Burgon's 
counsel seriously. (R. 298.) Mr. Burgon refused to attend marriage counselling with 
Ms. Burgon. (R. 209.) Later, Mr. Burgon's erratic behavior proved to be the result of a 
relationship with another woman. {See R. at 300 and 301.) Thereafter, Mr. and 
Ms. Burgon separated (R. 301.) In its oral bench ruling, the Court stated that "there was 
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more than sufficient evidence of ... adultery having been the major if not the sole cause of 
this marriage breakup." (R. 383.) While Mr. Burgon was involved in the behavior that 
resulted in the parties' separation, he was serving as a Bishop in the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints. (R. 208.) 
Given their lengthy marriage and Mr. Burgon's standing in their church, 
Mr. Burgon's actions devastated Ms. Burgon. (R. 212.) Due to her religious beliefs, 
Ms. Burgon envisioned both her mortal life and her afterlife as falling apart. (Id,) 
Ms. Burgon could not function normally for a period of time. (Id.) At times she was unable 
to go to work or she would return home from work sick, unable to complete her shift. 
(R. 212 and 213.) For a period of time, Ms. Burgon even approached the point of being 
suicidal. (Id.) To address the difficult emotional trauma caused by Mr. Burgon, 
Ms. Burgon incurred counselling fees that she is unable to repay on her own. (R. 213.) 
As part of its bench ruling, the trial court found that "Ms. Burgon has demonstrated 
and established by the weight of the evidence that she has a need for alimony. Mr. Burgon 
clearly has the ability to pay alimony. This is a long-term marriage, and without alimony 
[Ms.] Burgon could not even approximate her standard of living previously enjoyed prior to 
separation." (R. 392.) 
The trial court also understood its role in awarding alimony, stating that "my duty 
here and what I am trying to do is to approximate levels of income to each of you that will 
approximate the goal of what you had before you separated." (R. 392.) The trial court 
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reviewed the expenses of both parties. (Id,) The trial court found that certain expenses were 
not necessary and should not be a factor in an alimony award. (Id,) Nevertheless, the trial 
court found that Ms. Burgon's monthly expenses exceeded her ability to provide for their 
needs. (R. 170.) The trial court also specifically found that Mr. Burgon had the ability to 
pay alimony. (R. 170.) Based upon all of the facts presented at trial, the trial court found 
that Ms. Burgon was entitled to alimony in the amount of $1,050 per month. (R. 169.) 
The Trial Court's Ruling Pertaining to the Parties5 Marital Residence 
During the marriage, Mr. and Ms. Burgon acquired a home located in Salt Lake 
County. (R. 171.) The trial court awarded the home to Ms. Burgon, giving Mr. Burgon an 
equitable lien in the home in the amount of $44,663. (R. 172) The trial court ordered 
Ms. Burgon to pay Mr. Burgon the amount of his equitable lien when she refinanced the 
home, when child support obligations ended or when the home was no longer Ms. Burgon's 
primary residence, whichever occurred first. (Id,) The trial court also awarded Mr. Burgon 
the right to purchase the home when the child support obligations ended. (Id.) 
During their marriage, the Burgons also acquired an ownership interest in a Park 
City Sweetwater condominium. (R. 172.) The trial court awarded Mr. Burgon the couple's 
entire ownership interest in the condominium, free and clear of any claim by Ms. Burgon. 
(Id.) 
Mr. Burgon's Court Ordered Obligation to Pav Ms. Burgon's Attorney's Fees 
The trial court found that given the disparity of the parties' incomes, Ms. Burgon's 
need for assistance, and Mr. Burgon's ability to pay, that Mr. Burgon must pay the majority 
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of Ms. Burgon's attorney's fees incurred through trial. (R. 173.) The trial court also 
ordered that Mr. Burgon would be responsible to pay attorney's fees incurred by Ms. Burgon 
for preparation of the findings and any subsequent proceedings related to the divorce. 
(R. 396.) The trial court found it reasonable that Mr. Burgon pay attorney's fees of $1,000 
for Ms. Burgon's preparation of the findings, conclusions and the decree of divorce. 
(R. 173.) 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Mr, Burgon's Appeal of the Alimony Award, 
A trial court has considerable discretion in determining an appropriate award of 
alimony. The award will not be disturbed absent demonstration by appellant of clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. The record demonstrates that the court made sufficient 
findings to evidence consideration of the factors to be considered when awarding alimony. 
The record also sets forth clear, uncontro verted facts that establish as a matter of law that the 
alimony awarded was appropriate. 
B. Mr. Burgon's Appeal of the Division of the Marital Residence. 
A trial court's division of marital assets is subject to a presumption of validity. 
Mr. Burgon argues that he should be awarded interest on the equitable lien he received on 
his portion of the equity of the couple's home. His argument is unsupported by any law. 
The applicable Utah case law holds that he is not entitled to interest on an equitable lien. 
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C. Ms. Burgon Seeks Attorney's Fees. 
Ms. Burgon received an award of attorney's fees by the trial court. The trial court 
ruled that Ms. Burgon would receive attorney's fees in post-trial proceedings. Thus, 
Ms. Burgon is entitled to an award of attorney's fees for fees that she has been forced to 
incur to defend Mr. Burgon's appeal. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court's Award of Alimony to Ms. Burgon was not a Clear and 
Prejudicial Abuse of the Trial Court's Discretionary Authority. 
At the outset, it should be noted that a trial court has considerable discretion to 
determine and fix an appropriate award of alimony. This Court has recently held that it will 
affirm an alimony award unless the appellant can demonstrate clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion. Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Breinholt v. 
Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (1995) 
(neither cited nor addressed by Mr. Burgon in his brief) sets forth several factors that a trial 
court must consider and a few other factors that the trial court may consider in determining 
an alimony award. The trial court's findings evidence that the trial court considered the 
necessary factors in determining the alimony awarded to Ms. Burgon in this case. However, 
even if the Court were to determine that the trial court's findings pertaining to the alimony 
award were insufficiently detailed, the record is clear and uncontroverted so that the Court 
could apply the factors of § 30-3-5(7) as a matter of law and affirm the trial court's ruling. 
Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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1. The Findings Establish that the Trial Court Considered the Factors 
Required by Utah Code Ann, § 30-3-5(7)(a). 
The case law cited by Mr. Burgon predates the controlling statutory law that provides 
guidelines for alimony awards in Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) sets forth the 
following five factors that a court must, at a minimum, consider in determining alimony: 
1. the recipient spouse's financial condition and needs; 
2. the recipient spouse's ability to earn or produce income; 
3. the payor spouse's ability to provide support; and 
4. the length of the couple's marriage. 
The numerous oral findings and conclusions made from the bench at the conclusion of the 
trial, as well as the written findings and conclusions adopted and entered by the trial court 
reveal that the trial court considered each of these factors. 
The record establishes that the trial court reviewed the expenses of both parties and 
found that some of Ms. Burgon's expenses were excessive or inappropriate. For example, 
the trial court indicated that Ms. Burgon's estimate of entertainment expenses seemed 
excessive. Having critically viewed the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court 
found that Ms. Burgon's monthly expenses exceed her ability to provide for her needs. 
Thus, the trial court considered Ms. Burgon's financial condition, the first factor of the 
applicable statute. 
The trial court found that Ms. Burgon earns only $1,565 per month. Coupled with 
the finding that Ms. Burgon's ability to produce income is less than her monthly expenses, 
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the record reveals that the trial court considered Ms. Burgon's ability to earn a living on her 
own, the second factor. 
The record also reveals that the trial court considered the third factor, Mr. Burgon's 
ability to provide support. The trial court entered a finding that Mr. Burgon earns $4,643 
per month. The court expressly found that Mr. Burgon had the ability to pay alimony. 
Finally, it is clear that the trial court considered the fourth factor. The court entered 
a finding that the parties had been married twenty-one years prior to their divorce. 
The findings, as well as the record, demonstrate that the trial court considered each 
of the four factors required by § 30-3-5(7)(a). Mr. Burgon has failed to demonstrate a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion by the trial court as required by Marshall, Breinholt and 
other applicable case law. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the alimony awarded to 
Ms. Burgon by the trial court. 
2. The Clear, Uncontroverted Record Establishes as a Matter of Law 
that the Trial Court's Alimony Award did not Constitute an Abuse 
of Discretion. 
As set forth in the preceding section, the record establishes the trial court's 
consideration of each of the four factors of § 30-3-5(7)(a). However, even assuming for 
argument that the trial court failed to enter adequate findings to support its alimony award to 
Ms. Burgon, this Court should affirm the award because the clear, uncontroverted record 
establishes as a matter of law that the alimony awarded to Ms. Burgon was not an abuse of 
the trial court's discretionary power. See Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1991) (inadequate findings not reversible error when record is clear and uncontroverted, 
allowing the appeals court to apply factors to be considered in support of alimony award). 
The record is undisputed that Ms. Burgon had the ability to attain post-high school 
degrees. She received a scholarship to attend Brigham Young University. However, after 
she and Mr. Burgon married, they made the joint decision that Ms. Burgon would stay at 
home full-time and fulfill the child rearing and related responsibilities for the good of the 
family. The record is clear and undisputed that as a result of the couple's decision, 
Ms. Burgon's job skills limit her to a clerical-type position, where she earns approximately 
$1550 per month. 
Ms. Burgon's sacrifice for the family permitted Mr. Burgon to focus his energy and 
attention on developing his career and maximizing his earning potential. The record is 
undisputed that Mr. Burgon has been successful professionally and now earns approximately 
$4,640 per month. The record is clear and undisputed that Mr. Burgon expects to receive 
significant annual raises. 
The record is also undisputed that the Burgons were married for twenty-one years. 
Throughout their marriage the Burgons lived conservatively and there was very little marital 
debt when the couple divorced. 
The record also establishes clearly that the cause of the divorce was Mr. Burgon's 
extra-marital affair. Although the trial court dissolved the marriage on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences, the court stated on the record that the event that appeared to be the 
major, if not the sole cause of the parties' breakup was Mr. Burgon's act of adultery. 
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Mr. Burgon engaged in this destructive behavior at a time when he was acting as a Bishop in 
the L.D.S. Church. Given these factors, Mr. Burgon's unilateral actions devastated 
Ms. Burgon, causing her to become physically and emotionally ill. 
The purpose of alimony is "to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at 
the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage." Asper v. Asper, 753 P.2d 978, 981 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978). The 
record reveals that the trial court correctly recognized the purpose for alimony when 
determining the amount of the award in this case. {See R. at 392.) The clear, undisputed 
facts set forth in the record and summarized above support the reasonableness of the alimony 
awarded to Ms. Burgon by the trial court. 
As recognized in § 30-3-5(7)(a), the essential elements to be considered when 
determining alimony are the financial needs and condition of the recipient spouse, the ability 
of the recipient spouse to earn income, the payor spouse's ability to provide support; and the 
length of the couple's marriage. The record clearly demonstrates that the method in which 
the Burgons allocated the marital duties and responsibilities left Ms. Burgon in a position 
where she cannot legitimately sustain herself financially. Ms. Burgon has no college degree. 
Her job skills allow her to earn less than $10 per hour. In contrast, the couple's allocation 
of family responsibilities placed Mr. Burgon in an upper level income bracket. Indeed, 
Mr. Burgon's monthly income of $4643 is almost three times as much as Ms. Burgon's 
monthly income of $1565. The parties' comparative financial positions developed over the 
course of a twenty-one year marriage. Applying the elements of § 30-3-5(7)(a) to the 
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undisputed record mandates a conclusion that the alimony awarded to Ms. Burgon of $1050 
per month is extremely reasonable. 
In addition to the mandatory factors of § 30-3-5(7)(a), Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(7)(d) provides that a court may attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of 
living. In Asper, 753 P.2d at 981, the payor spouse's income was approximately three times 
higher than the income of the recipient spouse. This Court, reflecting upon the parties' 
unequal financial positions stated that such differences in income "alone indicate a disparity 
between Mrs. Asper's standard of living during the marriage and that which she will 
experience after the divorce." Id. Based upon the alimony awarded to Ms. Burgon, Ms. 
Burgon will have income of approximately $2600 per month.17 Subtracting $1050 alimony 
from Mr. Burgon's monthly income of $4643 leaves him with a monthly income of almost 
$3600, still a much higher income than Ms. Burgon's. Based upon the guidelines of § 30-3-
5(7)(d), the alimony award is extremely reasonable. 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(b) provides that a court may consider the fault 
of the parties in determining alimony. The undisputed record indicates that if not for Mr. 
Burgon's acts of infidelity, the parties would not have sought a divorce. The fault lies 
squarely upon Mr. Burgon's shoulders. 
When the record's undisputed facts are viewed within the framework of § 30-3-5(7), 
this Court can determine, as a matter of law, that the alimony awarded to Ms. Burgon by the 
trial court did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Therefore, even if this Court were to 
17
 $1050 monthly alimony and $1565 monthly income total approximately $2600 per month. 
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conclude that the findings of fact entered by the trial court were insufficient in detail, the 
award of alimony remains appropriate and reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court's award 
of alimony to Ms. Burgon should be affirmed. 
B. The Trial Court's Division of the Equity in the Parties' Marital Residence 
was Equitable. 
Without providing any legal authority, Mr. Burgon argues that the trial court erred 
when it failed to award him interest on the award of equity in the parties' marital residence 
he received. His contention is misplaced. In divorce proceedings, trial courts are quite free 
to enter orders concerning the division of property as long as the orders are equitable. Jones 
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). There is no fixed formula to which a court 
must adhere when dividing marital property. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Furthermore, the trial court's division of marital property is entitled 
to a presumption of validity. Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
In Osguthorpe, this Court heard an appeal from an order dividing a marital residence 
that was almost identical to the division made by the trial court in this case. In Osguthorpe, 
the appellant had been awarded an non-interest bearing equitable lien equal to one-half of the 
equity in the parties' home at the time of the divorce, to be paid when the appellee 
remarried, cohabitated, sold the home, moved from the home or when the youngest child 
reached the age of majority. 804 P.2d at 536. The appellant argued on appeal that he 
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should have been awarded interest on his equitable lien. This Court rejected the argument, 
holding that interest does not attach to an equitable lien. 804 P.2d at 536. 
What Mr. Burgon would like is for this Court to review one aspect of the trial 
court's entire division of the marital estate. An appellate review of division of property 
cannot take place in such a vacuum. For example, Ms. Burgon does not feel it is fair that 
she is faced with the possibility of moving from the home in which she has lived for more 
than half of her life and all of her adult life. Nevertheless, that is what the trial court felt to 
be an equitable division of the parties' property. Ms. Burgon did not receive any portion of 
the couple's ownership in the Sweetwater condominium. It is simply not appropriate for 
Mr. Burgon to attack one portion of the trial court's division of the couple's marital assets. 
Most importantly, Mr. Burgon's position has previously been rejected by this Court in the 
Osguthorpe case. Thus, the trial court's order must be affirmed. 
C. Based Upon the Trial Court's Prior Ruling, Ms. Burgon is Entitled to an 
Award of Attorney's Fees Incurred to Defend Mr. Burgon's Appeal. 
In accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 and other applicable law, the trial court 
found that given the disparity of the parties' incomes, Ms. Burgon's need for assistance, and 
Mr. Burgon's ability to pay, Mr. Burgon would be responsible for the majority of 
Ms. Burgon's attorney's fees incurred through trial. (R. 173.) The record further indicates 
that the trial court ordered Mr. Burgon to pay future attorney's fees incurred by Ms. Burgon 
in any post-trial proceedings. (R. 396.) Ms. Burgon is entitled to an award of attorney's 
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fees she has been forced to incur to defend Mr. Burgon's appeal. The case law supports 
both the trial court's prospective ruling on fees and Ms. Burgon's request. 
In Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719, 727 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this Court stated that 
"when a trial court awards fees in a divorce action to a party who then prevails on appeal, 
that party will also be entitled to fees on appeal." In Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992), this Court held that the district court has discretion to order one party to pay 
the other party's attorney's fees incurred in appeals. 
Mr. Burgon's appeal has forced Ms. Burgon to continue to endure additional 
emotional and financial stress. In accordance with the trial court's directive, Mr. Burgon 
should be required to pay the attorney's fees Ms. Burgon has incurred and will incur to 
defend Mr. Burgon's appeal. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The trial court entered sufficient findings to evidence that it made the requisite 
considerations in awarding alimony to Ms. Burgon. Even if the findings were not sufficient, 
the record is clear and uncontroverted on facts that permit this Court to affirm the alimony 
award as a matter of law. Mr. Burgon's request that he be awarded interest on his equitable 
lien in the parties' marital home is totally without merit. Thus, Ms. Burgon requests that the 
Court affirm the trial court's divorce decree in its entirety. In addition, based on the ruling 
by the trial court and the applicable law, Ms. Burgon is entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees incurred to defend Mr. Burgon's appeal. Accordingly, Ms. Burgon respectfully requests 
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the Court to order Mr. Burgon to pay the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Ms. Burgon 
in this proceeding. 
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